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THE COMMODIFICATION OF PERSONAL
DATA AND THE ROAD TO CONSUMER
AUTONOMY THROUGH THE CCPA
ABSTRACT
The internet has transformed into a museum of personal information
collected through the digital footprint we leave behind after each act
performed on the web. Businesses have monetized this collection of
personal data in various ways. For instance, many companies analyze this
information through predicting analytics and data profiling to identify
consumer interests that they can exploit as a means to generate revenue.
Though user data promotes many benefits for businesses and consumers
alike, the recent data breaches of massive companies, coupled with hazy
privacy disclosures that beget consent disputes, have left both users and
businesses perturbed and exposed to various risks. The California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) attempts to regulate businesses’ use of
Californian consumer data and purports to be a promising solution to
concerns regarding data privacy. However, its poor drafting and
unintelligible requirements pose serious challenges such that the Act
ultimately fails to provide consumers with primary control over their
personal information that’s collected online. This Note examines the “antidiscrimination” provision enumerated in section 1798.125 of the CCPA
and addresses the ineffectual restraints placed on businesses that transact
in personal data. To encourage transparency and enable informed
consumer decision-making, this Note recommends that California should:
1) void the reasonable-relationship exception in section 1798.125(a)(2)
since it undermines the provision, and the valuation of personal data across
different industries is inconsistent and unmanageable; and 2) supplement
the “financial incentives exception” in section 1798.125(b)(1) with
additional restrictions on permissible practices that prioritize disclosure
and foster consumer autonomy.
INTRODUCTION1
Data privacy regulations concern the legal restrictions and customs that
“govern the use, transfer, and processing of personal data.” 2 Increased

1. While writing this Note, California voters passed Proposition 24, the California Privacy
Rights Act (CPRA) of 2020. The CPRA amends and expands numerous provisions within the
existing CCPA and will become operative on January 1, 2023. However, this Note and statutory
language quoted herein refers only to the existing language of the CCPA. See CPRA, CA
Proposition 24 (2020), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/19-0021A1%20%28
Consumer%20Privacy%20-%20Version%203%29_1.pdf; see also Robert N. Famigletti &
Christine E. Lyon, CPRA Passes: California Voters Approve Proposition 24, CLIENT ALERT
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/201104-cpra-passes-california.html.
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attention on infamous data breaches coupled with growing concerns over
the security of personal information 3 has culminated in a widespread
demand for data privacy legislation. Yet, the federal government has
refrained from implementing a universal data privacy regime, which has
resulted in a nationwide patchwork of nonuniform and unclear state laws
and industry specific regulations.4
In 2018, California passed the California Consumer Privacy Act of
2018 (the Act or CCPA)—perhaps the most sweeping privacy legislation
ever enacted in United States history.5 The CCPA6 establishes both privacy
limits and obligations on businesses managing 7 data of Californian
consumers.8 Additionally, the Act provides California residents new rights
for protecting and retaining authority over their personal information,9 such
as “the right to request that a business delete any personal information
about the consumer which the business has collected,”10 and the right “to
direct a business that sells personal information about the consumer to third
parties not to sell the consumer’s personal information.”11 Although the Act
is a California statute, any business regardless of location is subject to the
Act’s provisions if it collects, or controls the collection of, personal

2. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2058 (2004) (citing Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1659–60 (1999)).
3. See generally Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/.
4. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approachdata-protection; see also STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, WILSON C. FREEMAN, CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH,
CONG. RES. SERV., R45631, DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW (Mar. 25, 2019).
5. The Act was passed in 2018 but did not go into effect until January 1, 2020. See Purvi G.
Patel, Nathan D. Taylor & Alexandra E. Laks, The 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act,
MORRISON & FOERSTER (June 29, 2018), https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/180629california-consumer-privacy-act-2018.html#_ftn1.
6. The CCPA defines a “consumer” as any “natural person who is a California resident,”
which is defined in section 17014 of Title 18 of the California Code of Regulations. See CCPA,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(g) (2018); see also 18 CCR § 17014(a)(1) (2018) (“Resident includes
every individual who is in this state for other than a temporary or transitory purpose.”).
7. The Act applies to businesses that either collect or control the collection of consumer
personal information. See generally CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (2018).
8. Confusion over the definition of “Californian consumer” remains a point of notable
concern since the breadth of the definition of “consumer” extends far beyond state borders and
instigates other difficulties in interpretation. See Harriet Pearson, Fran Faircloth & Catherine
Essig, California Consumer Privacy Act: The Challenge Ahead – Key Terms in the CCPA,
CHRON. OF DATA PROTECTION 2 (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.hldataprotection.com/2018/
09/articles/consumer-privacy/california-consumer-privacy-act-the-challenge-ahead-key-terms-inthe-ccpa/.
9. See Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, California Passes Landmark Consumer
Privacy CCPA – What it Means for Businesses, JD SUPRA (July 9, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.
com/legalnews/california-passes-landmark-consumer-87324/.
10. CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.105(a) (2018).
11. Id. § 1798.120(a).
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information from a California resident 12 and meets other qualitative
factors. 13 Thus, the Act’s enactment prompted a majority of businesses
throughout the United States to quickly adopt and amend practices to
comply with the legislation before it took effect in 2020.14 In fact, several
states have initiated other legislative proposals to introduce their own
rendition of privacy laws, remarkably similar to the CCPA.15
While the CCPA attempts to answer the call for data protection, the Act
continues to be met with considerable criticism related to unclear
definitions, 16 ambiguities within provisions, 17 and insufficient guidance
concerning these issues from the California Attorney General.18 Although
amendments addressing these issues have been added,19 questions regarding
several of its provisions remain unanswered.20
In particular, the “anti-discrimination provision” documented in section
1798.125 of the CCPA 21 has generated notable controversy among
businesses. 22 While this provision is intended to prevent and prohibit

12. What Businesses Outside California Should Know About the California Consumer Privacy
Act, TANNENHAUM HELPERN SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.
thsh.com/publications/what-businesses-outside-california-should-know-about-the-californiaconsumer-privacy-act.
13. Businesses must also satisfy one of the following thresholds: (1) annually earns gross
revenues in excess of $25,000,000; (2) annually buys, sells, or receives or shares for commercial
purposes, alone or in combination, the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers,
households, or devices; or (3) derives at least 50% of its annual revenues from selling consumers’
personal information. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(c)(1).
14. Patel et al., supra note 5.
15. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Jason C. Gavejian & Maya Atrakchi, State Law Developments in
Consumer Privacy, JACSKSONLEWIS (Mar. 15, 2019) https://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com
/2019/03/articles/consumer-privacy/state-law-developments-in-consumer-privacy/.
16. See Letter from Eric Goldman on behalf of 41 California Privacy Experts to California
Legislature (Jan. 17, 2019), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2019/01/41-california-privacy-experts-urge-major-changes-to-the-california-consumer-privacyact.htm.
17. See Ronald I. Raether, Sadia Mirza, INSIGHT: So the CCPA is Ambiguous – Now What?,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-datasecurity/insight-so-the-ccpa-is-ambiguous-now-what.
18. See Sam Sabin, Companies Know California Privacy Law Goes Into Effect by Jan. 1, but
Little Else, MORNING CONSULT: DATA PRIV. (Aug. 21, 2019, 11:31 AM), https://morningconsult.
com/2019/08/21/companies-know-california-privacy-law-goes-into-effect-by-jan-1-but-little-else/.
19. See Jeewon Kim Serrato & Susan Ross, And then there were five: CCPA amendments pass
legislature,
DATA
PROT.
REP.
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2019/09/and-then-there-were-five-ccpa-amendments-passlegislature/.
20. See David Stauss, Bob Bowman, Marci Kawski & Tobias P. Moon, CCPA Update:
Analyzing the G’s Proposed Regulations, BYTE BACK (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.
bytebacklaw.com/2019/10/ccpa-update-analyzing-the-ags-proposed-regulations/#more-2508.
21. “Anti-discrimination provision” refers generally to CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125
(2018).
22. See generally Mark Brennan, James Denvil, Shee Shee Jin & Jonathan Hirsch, California
Consumer Privacy Act: The Challenge Ahead – The CCPA’s Anti-Discrimination Clause, CHRON.
DATA PROT. 10th (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.hldataprotection.com/2018/12/articles/consumer-
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businesses from discriminating against consumers who exercise their newly
obtained rights granted by the Act, 23 it also provides exceptions “to the
general prohibition on discrimination.” 24 These exceptions authorize
businesses to create a tiered pricing structure to charge different prices for
consumers who voluntarily provide their data 25 and permit businesses to
offer “financial incentives” in exchange for personal information. 26 The
plain language of section 1798.125, which allows a business to charge
consumers who exercise their rights “a different price or rate”27 or provide
“a different level or quality of goods or services to the consumer,”28 appears
to contradict the provision29 immediately preceding that authorization. This
prefatory language explicitly forbids businesses from “[c]harging different
prices or rates for goods or services,” or “[p]roviding a different level or
quality of goods or services” to consumers who exercise their rights. 30
Thus, although section 1798.125 may have been well-intended, the plain
language 31 of the provision, without further clarification, instantiates the
“contradictory and ambiguous”32 nature of the Act.
Businesses have struggled to make sense of this paradox and are
confused about how the provision would legally work. 33 The recurring
questions and concerns echoed by these businesses illuminate the
fundamental problems with this provision. 34 Specifically, the “reasonable
relationship exception” in section 1798.125(a)(2), 35 which permits
businesses to charge consumers who provide their data, as compared to
those who do not, with enticing prices so long as that “difference [in price]

privacy/california-consumer-privacy-act-the-challenge-ahead-the-ccpas-anti-discriminationclause/.
23. CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125 (2018).
24. See generally Brennan, et al., supra note 22.
25. CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
26. Id. § 1798.125(b)(1).
27. Id. § 1798.125(a)(2).
28. Id.
29. See generally id. § 1798.125(a)(1).
30. Id.
31. Compare CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(1) (“A business shall not discriminate
against a consumer because the consumer exercised any of the consumer’s rights under this title . .
. .”), with CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b)(1) (“A business may offer financial incentives,
including payments to consumers as compensation, for the collection of personal information, the
sale of personal information, or the deletion of personal information. A business may also offer a
different price, rate, level, or quality of goods or services to the consumer . . . .”).
32. See Anthony Dazhan, CCPA compliance: A rocky road ahead?, DATAGUISE BLOG (Mar.
28, 2019), https://www.dataguise.com/blog/ccpa-compliance-rocky-road-ahead.
33. See id.
34. See Grant Davis-Denny, Confusion in Calif. Privacy Act’s Anti-Discrimination Rule, LAW
360 (Sept. 5, 2018, 1:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1079569/confusion-in-califprivacy-act-s-anti-discrimination-rule.
35. “Reasonable relationship exception” refers generally to CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §
1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
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is reasonably related to the value provided to the business,” 36 presents
challenges in terms of calculating the value of that data to which the
provision refers. 37 The “financial incentives exception” in section
1798.125(b)(1) 38 is also problematic since it fails to explicate allowable
compensatory payments39––the only demarcation between permissible and
impermissible incentives is the vague caveat outlined in section
1798.125(b)(4) which proscribes “incentive practices that are unjust,
unreasonable, coercive, or usurious in nature.”40
The unaddressed ambiguity and deficient language within the antidiscrimination provision leaves businesses to translate for themselves what
the provision requires for compliance41—a precarious guessing game that
affects unknowing consumers who transact with these players. Since there
is little likelihood that the grey area will be clarified by further
amendments,42 businesses must look to the legislative intent43 and common
industry practices to formulate a uniform and appropriate interpretation of
this provision.
Accordingly, Part I of this Note will recount the evolution of the
internet and the development of the personal data marketplace, as well as
the current data privacy regulations in the United Sates. Part II will discuss
the creation of the CCPA and the legislative intent behind its
implementation. Part III will illuminate the ambiguities and inadequacies of
section 1798.125, the anti-discrimination provision, and consider the
impending consequences that will likely result from its unintelligible
36. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018) (“Nothing in this subdivision prohibits
a business from charging a consumer a different price or rate, or from providing a different level
or quality of goods or services to the consumer, if that difference is reasonably related to the value
provided to the business by the consumer’s data.”).
37. See Muge Fazlioglu, Top 5 Operational Impacts of the CCPA: Part 4 – Rights of erasure,
objection to sale, and nondiscrimination, INT’L ASSOC. PRIVACY PROFS. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://
iapp.org/news/a/top-5-operational-impacts-of-cacpa-part-4-rights-of-erasure-objection-to-saleand-non-discrimination/#.
38. “Financial incentives exception” refers generally to CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §
1798.125(b)(1) (2018).
39. CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code §1798.125(b)(1) states that “financial incentives, including
payments to consumers as compensation” are permissible but does not provide any further detail
defining what other incentives businesses may offer to induce consumers to relinquish their
personal information. See id.
40. Id. § 1798.125(b)(4).
41. See Lydia F de la Torre, Interpreting CCPA using the “Golden Rule”: Purposes for
processing, sales, and records threshold, GOLDEN DATA BLOG (Sept. 7, 2019), https://
medium.com/golden-data/interpreting-ccpa-using-the-golden-rule-6fcb1a8d03b5.
42. The end of the legislative session was September 13, 2019. Therefore the CCPA, once
signed by the Governor, will take effect on January 1, 2020, as drafted, with few changes from
amendments and regulations. See Deborah A. George, California CCPA Amendment Update:
Here’s What Passed, ROBINSON COLE (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.dataprivacyandsecurity
insider.com/2019/09/california-ccpa-amendment-update-heres-what-passed/.
43. See generally Lauren Mattiuzzo, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation,
HEINONLINE BLOG (Mar. 22, 2018), https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2018/03/legislative-intentand-statutory-interpretation/.
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drafting. Finally, Part IV will offer a solution to the existing problems
within section 1798.125 that protects both businesses and consumers by
voiding the “reasonable relationship exception” provided in section
1798.125(a)(2), and amending the “financial incentives exception”
authorized in section 1798.125(b)(1) to include additional regulations that
refashion the restraints on businesses in a manner that advances the
legislative intent behind the Act and provides value to consumers.
I.

BACKGROUND

“We are in a very interesting and, I would say, complicated period in
the internet’s history, on this planet anyway, of trying to figure out how to
maximize its utility while minimizing some of the harmful aspects that are
appearing.”44
A. EXPANSION OF THE INTERNET
DATA MARKETPLACE

THE UNDERGROUND

As the computerization of information developed, concerns about
privacy increased and Congress attempted to regulate information held by
federal agencies. 45 Still, many legislative attempts to control government
information systems fell short. 46 Amid the internet’s evolution, personal
information became a coveted target for commodification.47
“Commodified personal data is a discrete package of personal
information that can be exchanged for something else.”48 The process of
commodifying data into a profit generating asset involves four main stages:
“(i) collection (ii) processing (iii) mining, and (iv) usage.” 49 The internet

44. Vinton Cerf, Future of the Internet with Vint Cerf, CXO TALK #331 (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.cxotalk.com/episode/future-internet-vint-cerf. Vinton Cerf, Chief Internet Evangelist,
Google, is a computer scientist often referred to as the “Father of the Internet” for creating, with
Robert Kahn, “the TCP/IP protocols and the architecture of the Internet.” See Vint Cerf, INTERNET
HALL FAME (last visited Oct. 11, 2019), https://internethalloffame.org/inductees/vint-cerf.
45. See Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A); see also Privacy Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (2000) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a); see also Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g).
46. See Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON
PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE, PLI 1, 1–
26 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2016) (2006), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2076&context=faculty_publications.
47. A “commodity” is a good “that is subject to ready exchange or exploitation within a
market.” Commodity, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
commodity (last visited Mar. 30, 2021).
48. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2069
(2004).
49. See Emile Douilhet & Dr. Argyro Karanasiou, Legal responses to the commodification of
personal data in the era of big data: The paradigm shift from data protection towards data
ownership, INFORM. COMM. SOC., 2 (June 2012), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
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provides new methods for collecting information 50 through “clickstream
data” 51 and “cookies,” 52 which allows websites to identify and aggregate
user information through an individual’s online activity.53 Businesses use
computer algorithms and analytics software to gather consumer data and
help recognize behavioral patterns. 54 Consumer data tracking is then
employed to increase sales 55 and generate revenue through numerous
mechanisms 56 like creating targeted advertising 57 and trading information
through data brokerage companies.58 Data can also be rented to marketers
as another source of income.59
This process precipitated the inception of a personal data trade
market. 60 Data brokers 61 buy and sell personal data they have gathered
through public records, commercial sources, and online activity, among

316878931_Legal_responses_to_the_commodification_of_personal_data_in_the_era_of_big_data
_The_paradigm_shift_from_data_protection_towards_data_ownership.
50. See Solove, supra note 46, at 1–36.
51. “A clickstream is a record that contains data about a website user’s clicks on a computer
display screen . . . [which] provides a visual trail of user activity with detailed feedback. Such data
. . . facilitate[s] market research. . . .” Clickstream, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/15403/clickstream (last visited Dec. 27, 2019); see also Solove, supra note 46, at 1–36
52. “A cookie is the term given to describe a type of message that is given to a web browser by
a web server. The main purpose of a cookie is to identify users and possibly prepare customized
Web pages or to save site login information for you. . . . [A] cookie will contain . . . information
about the browser. . . . Some Web sites do use cookies to store more personal information about
you.” See Vangie Beal, What are Cookies and What do Cookies Do?, WEBOPEDIA (Sept. 4, 2008),
https://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/all_about_cookies.asp; see also Solove, supra
note 46, at 1–36.
53. See Max Eddy, How Companies Turn Your Data Into Money, PCMAG: FEATURES (Oct.
10, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/364152/how-companies-turn-your-data-intomoney.
54. See Cindy Waxer, How data mining can boost your revenue by 300%, CNNMONEY (Oct.
28, 2013, 6:20 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/10/28/smallbusiness/data-mining/.
55. Id.
56. See Douilhet & Karanasious, supra note 49.
57. Eddy, supra note 53.
58. See Wibson, What is a Decentralized, Privacy-Preserving Data Marketplace, and Why is it
Important for You?, MEDIUM (Dec. 1, 2017) https://medium.com/wibson/what-is-a-decentralizedprivacy-preserving-data-marketplace-and-why-is-it-important-for-you-b49df43c213c.
59. See Solove, supra note 46, at 1-36 (citing Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN L. REV. 1393, 1407–09 (2001)).
60. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2069 (2004).
61. See What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It?:
Hearing on S. Hrg. 113-693 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
113th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, U.S. Senator from West
Virginia, citing Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change, at 68 (Mar. 2012)) (“While there is no statutory definition for ‘data brokers,’ the Federal
Trade Commission has defined this term to include ‘companies that collect information, including
personal information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling
such information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an individual’s
identity, differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial fraud.’”).
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others.62 Data brokers amass “categories of information about individuals”
which provide insight into consumer behaviors, buying preferences, and
even a consumer’s location at the time the data is collected.63 By merely
using a smartphone or credit card in the current technology landscape,
consumers unknowingly expose the most intimate details of their lives to
companies, ranging from “if you’ve just gone through a break-up, if you’re
pregnant or trying to lose weight” to “what medicine you take, where
you’ve been, and even how you swipe and tap on your smartphone.” 64
Worst of all, consumers are usually unaware of this process or have not
consented65 to their information transmogrifying into a commodity used by
a “faceless corporation.”66
Despite industry-specific guidelines and privacy-related consumer
protection laws that protect personal information, 67 there is still no
comprehensive federal data privacy law in the United States.68 The growth
of the internet has also been accompanied by the rise in data breaches which
“have become troublingly pervasive and continue to increase in
prevalence,” 69 often affecting billions of consumers of some of the most
prominent corporations throughout the United States.70 Due to the increased
severity and frequency of data breaches, as well as heightened consumer
awareness and concern over how businesses use personal information,
62. See Yael Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping Up Information
About You?, MOTHERBOARD: TECH BY VICE (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-brokers-and-how-to-stop-my-private-data-collection.
63. See What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It?:
Hearing on S. Hrg. 113-693 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
113th Cong. 14 (2015) (statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, U.S. Senator from West
Virginia) (identifying several examples of categories of information that data brokers collect from
individuals).
64. Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here are the data brokers quietly buying and selling
your personal information, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 02, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com
/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-your-personal-information.
65. See Wibson, supra note 58.
66. See Nate Cardozo, Internet Companies: Confusing Consumers for Profit, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/internet-companies-confusingconsumers-profit.
67. See Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–
09); see also Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
68. See generally Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html
?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default.
69. See William Williams, On the Clock, Best Bet to Draft Cyberdefensive Lineman: Federal
Regulation of Sports Betting from a Cybersecurity Perspective, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 539, 548 (2019) (citing Data Breaches Compromised 4.5 Billion Records in First Half of
2018, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181008005322
/en/.).
70. See generally Latoya Irby, 10 Biggest Data Breaches That Affected U.S. Consumers,
BALANCE: PERS. FIN. (June 25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/the-10-biggest-data-breachesthat-affected-u-s-consumers-4570940.
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Congress and state legislatures have felt increased pressure to address the
deficiency of data privacy legislation within the nation.71 Additionally, the
proliferation of privacy regimes in other advanced economies, 72 most
notably the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) in the European Union, has compelled the United States to turn
discussion into action.73
B. CURRENT FEDERAL PRIVACY REGULATIONS
Under the current regime in the United States, there are several federal
laws that oversee different aspects of personal information protection 74
including: 1) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 75 which imposes
duties on financial institutions 76 regarding consumer “nonpublic personal
information;”77 2) the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,78 which offers
some regulation over data breaches;79 3) the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act), 80 which provides significant data protection safeguards 81 and
has a “uniquely important role . . . in the U.S. data protection landscape;”82
and 4) the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA),83 which regulates
financial services provided to consumers84 but is relatively “inactive in the
data privacy and security space.”85

71. See Joseph V. Moreno, Sohie K. Cuthbertson, James A. Treanor, Keith M. Gerver &
Stephen Weiss, The Digital Revolution Takes on New Meaning: Among Calls for Heightened U.S.
Data Privacy Measures, California is King, CADWALADER (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.
cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/the-digital-revolution-takes-on-new-meaningamong-calls-for-heightened-us-data-privacy-measures-california-is-king.
72. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approachdata-protection (noting that Canada, Israel, and Japan, have all started implementing privacy
regimes comparable to the GDPR).
73. Id.
74. Mulligan et al., supra note 4, at 7.
75. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012).
76. Mulligan et al., supra note 4, at 8.
77. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6809(4)(a)–(c) (2012) (defining
“nonpublic personal information” as “personally identifiable financial information” provided to a
financial institution by a consumer, “resulting from any transaction with the consumer,” or
“otherwise obtained by the financial institution” and “does not include publicly available
information.”).
78. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
79. Mulligan et al., supra note 4, at 21–22.
80. See Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
81. Mulligan et al., supra note 4, at 32 (“The FTC has brought hundreds of enforcement
actions against companies alleging deceptive or unfair data protection practices.”).
82. Id.
83. See Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat.
1376, 1955–2113 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491–5603).
84. There is a comprehensive list defining “financial products or services,” which includes
extending credit, brokering leases of property, engaging in deposit-taking activities, and providing
payment processing services, among others. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15) (2010).
85. Mulligan et al., supra note 4, at 36.
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Despite the aforementioned regulations, there is no comprehensive
federal privacy law that safeguards the personal data obtained through new
technologies86 and used within the online data marketplace.87 The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has undertaken an important task of patrolling
cybersecurity and enforcing consumer protection violations, 88 often
managing actions related to a corporation’s failure “to protect consumer
data against hackers.”89 In FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide, the Third Circuit
upheld the FTC’s authority to “regulate corporate cybersecurity through
45(a).”90 Despite Wyndham’s attempt to limit the span of the FTC Act91 by
excluding cybersecurity violations from the Commission’s reach, 92 the
court reaffirmed the FTC’s ability to bring “unfairness actions against
companies whose inadequate cybersecurity resulted in consumer harm.”93
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit also “recognize[d] that the Commission’s
existing authority may not be sufficient to effectively protect consumers
with regard to all data privacy issues of potential concern.”94 Though the
“FTC currently remains a key linchpin in the U.S. data protection
regulatory regime,”95 there are still large gaps within data privacy law that
remain unfilled. Notably, the sectoral approach to data privacy in the United
States has created gaps in data protection where specific industries that lack
privacy regulation remain unchecked.96

86. See generally What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They
Use It?: Hearing on S. Hrg. 113-693 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 113th Cong. 55 (2015) (statement of Hon. John Thune, U.S. Senator from South
Dakota).
87. The “data marketplace” concept represents the online platform where data is exchanged
and personal information is traded by companies and data brokers, often without consumer
consent or knowledge. See Wibson, supra note 58.
88. See generally Memorandum from the Federal Trade Commission on its consumer
protection powers and enforcement authority, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Oct. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.
89. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
90. Id. at 248.
91. See FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”).
92. See Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 247.
93. Id. at 249.
94. Id. (citing In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., 2014-1 Trade Cases P 78784 (F.T.C.), 2014 WL
253518, at *6 (Jan. 16, 2014)).
95. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2269 (2015).
96. A sectoral approach “means that there are a multitude of different laws regulating different
industries rather than just one general statute to regulate all collection and use of personal data.”
See id. at 2267.
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II. CREATION OF THE CCPA
“If you’re not paying for it, you’re not the customer; you’re the product
being sold.” 97
A. GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE ACT
The crescendo of personal data exploitation continued to intensify as
“data broker[s] and ad-tech industries” 98 overwhelmingly misused
consumer information, and finally reached its peak in March 201899 when
the Cambridge Analytica100 scandal shocked the nation. After Cambridge
Analytica improperly harvested101 data from roughly 87 million Facebook
profiles,102 the misappropriated “information was later deployed in political
campaigns”103 and allegedly used by President Trump’s campaign staff to
create targeted ads based on user data during the 2016 election.104 Although
theories and suppositions about how data could be mishandled were
beginning to swell, it took this event for many individuals to grasp how this
“squishy, intangible thing called privacy has real-world consequences.”105
The California Legislature recognized the harm caused to the entire tech
industry 106 by these “scandals and blowbacks,” 107 which heightened the
“desire for privacy controls and transparency in data practices.” 108
Accordingly, it created the CCPA with “the intent . . . to further

97. See Timothy Taylor, “If You’re Not Paying for It, You’re the Product”, CONVERSABLE
ECONOMIST (Jan. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM) (statement of Andrew Lewis), http://conversableeconomist.
blogspot.com/2018/01/if-youre-not-paying-for-it-youre-product.html.
98. Stop companies from exploiting our data!, GDPR TODAY (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.
gdprtoday.org/stop-companies-from-exploiting-our-data/.
99. See generally Assemb. Bill 375, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 55, Sec. 2(g) (Cal. 2018).
100. Cambridge Analytica is a data analytics firm that “provides data-driven campaigning and
marketing services” to customers “for the electoral process.” See Cambridge Analytica, Section on
Company Profile and News, BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/
1584842D:LN (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).
101. The term “data harvesting” refers to the process of extracting and analyzing “data collected
from online sources.” See Data Mining Process: The Difference Between Data Mining & Data
Harvesting, IMPORT.IO (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.import.io/post/the-difference-between-datamining-data-harvesting/.
102. See In re Facebook – Cambridge Analytica, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/
privacy/facebook/cambridge-analytica/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
103. See Alexandra Ma & Ben Gilbert, Facebook understood how dangerous the Trump-linked
data firm Cambridge Analytica could be much earlier than it previously said. Here’s everything
that’s happened up until now., BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/cambridge-analytica-a-guide-to-the-trump-linked-data-firm-thatharvested-50-million-facebook-profiles-2018-3.
104. Id.
105. See Issie Lapowsky, How Cambridge Analytica Sparked the Great Privacy Awakening,
WIRED: BUS. (Mar. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/cambridge-analyticafacebook-privacy-awakening/.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Assemb. Bill 375, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 55, Sec. 2(g) (Cal. 2018).
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Californians’ right to privacy by giving consumers an effective way to
control their personal information.”109
Though California is known to be a trailblazer in technology, 110
California law has not kept pace with growing privacy concerns.111 In an
attempt to safeguard consumer’s personal information, 112 the state
legislature passed the Act. 113 While it “is intended to provide California
residents with greater transparency and control over how businesses collect
and use their personal information,”114 in its original form, “[t]he CCPA is
riddled with typos and has provisions that are vague or simply do not make
sense.”115
B. AMENDMENTS AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO THE
ACT
In the attempt to clarify “several important issues,” the California
Attorney General passed numerous amendments to the CCPA and released
the third and “Final Text of Regulations” 116 on August 14, 2020. 117 The
draft regulations were adopted “to operationalize the CCPA and provide
clarity and specificity to assist in the implementation of the law.”118 To that
end, the regulations offer “illustrative examples”119 to assist businesses draft
permissible financial incentives and a pilot program for calculating the
value of consumer data.120
The statute omits any methodology capable of appraising consumer
data, 121 which is one of the main factors used to determine allowable

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 2(i).
Id. at 2(c).
Id. at 2(d).
Id. at 2(e).
Id. at 2(c).
See Richard B. Newman, California AG Releases Draft California Privacy Act
Regulations, NAT. L. REV. (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-agreleases-draft-california-privacy-act-regulations.
115. See Overview of the New California Consumer Privacy Law, BAKERHOSTETLER (last
visited Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2019/01/
Overview-of-the-New-California-Consumer-Privacy-Law.pdf.
116. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999 (2020), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files
/agweb/pdfs/privacy/oal-sub-final-text-of-regs.pdf?.
117. See Press Release, Attorney General Becerra Submits Proposed Regulations for Approval
Under the California Consumer Privacy Act (June 2, 2020), https://oag.ca.gov/news/pressreleases/attorney-general-becerra-submits-proposed-regulations-approval-under-california.
118. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section I, at 1, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all
/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
119. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.336(d) (2020).
120. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section IV, at 37, https://oag.ca.gov/sites
/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
121. See id.
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exceptions to the prohibition of discriminatory practices. 122 Hence, the
regulations attempt to provide clarity and instruction to businesses in
offering financial incentives to consumers, as well as transparency to
consumers on how those businesses utilize their data.123 Be that as it may,
the illustrations are unavailing and many aspects of the law remain obscure
and unresolved 124 — particularly the “interpretation of the statutory
exemptions.”125 Therefore, it is unlikely that the regulations will sufficiently
explain section 1798.125 so as to push the provision across the goal line.
III. PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 17 8.125
“Offering consumers a few dollars while failing to address the more
problematic issues surrounding data use seems to miss the mark.”126
A. UNCLEAR LANGUAGE
Section 1798.125(a)(2)’s reasonable-relationship exception allows
businesses to charge a different price or provide a different quality of goods
or services to consumers who relinquish their data, so long as that
difference is “reasonably related to the value provided to the business by the
consumer’s data.” 127 In the same subdivision and immediately preceding
that authorization, section 1798.125(a)(1) forbids businesses from charging
altered prices or providing different quality goods to consumers who
exercise their privacy rights and deems these acts discriminatory. 128 The
plain language of this provision appears contradictory. Within section
1798.125(a), the legislature proscribes discrimination against consumers
who exercise their rights under the statute, yet simultaneously allows for
consumers to be treated differently,129 and explicitly empowers businesses
to incentivize consumers to renounce their rights by offering a different
price and quality for goods in exchange for their data.130 Navigating through
122. See generally CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125 (2018).
123. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section IV, at 36, https://oag.ca.gov
/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
124. See Nadine Peters & Andrew Rusczek, Proposed Regulations Under the CCPA Provide
Some Clarity, But Questions Remain, JD SUPRA (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com
/legalnews/proposed-regulations-under-the-ccpa-65684/.
125. Id.
126. Jessica B. Lee, The Value of Talking About the Value of Consumer Data, ADMONSTERS
(Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.admonsters.com/value-consumer-data/.
127. CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
128. See id. § 1798.125(a)(1).
129. See Seamus Duffy, Natasha Kohne, Meredith Slawe & Michael Stortz, California
Businesses Avoid Privacy Class Action Explosion, LAW 360 (May 21, 2019), https://www.law360.
com/articles/1161746/calif-businesses-avoid-privacy-class-action-explosion.
130. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018) (“Nothing in this subdivision prohibits
a business from charging a consumer a different price or rate, or from providing a different level
or quality of goods or services to the consumer, if that difference is reasonably related to the value
provided to the business by the consumer’s data.”).
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these confusing statutory intricacies is comparable to a “trip down the rabbit
hole into Wonderland,”131 and may expose a business to massive liability132
despite its “good faith efforts to make sense of this maze.”133
Notwithstanding the pronounced contradiction of section 1798.125,
interpreting this provision is far from simple as it is difficult to unravel
compliance requirements from the plain statutory language.134 To adhere to
this provision’s directives, businesses must quantify the value of an
individual consumer’s data and come up with an enticement that is
reasonably related to that valuation, yet appraising a commodity like
consumer data is no easy feat. In October 2019, the California Attorney
General promulgated proposed regulations in an attempt to clarify specific
language in the Act to ensure the law was implemented successfully. 135
Despite the supplementation of explanatory elaborations 136 to the antidiscrimination provision, the regulations were ineffectual. Although the
regulations mandate that a business utilize a reasonable and good faith
method for calculating the value of the consumer’s data and record its
findings, 137 its enumeration of eight approaches 138 —including a “catchall
provision” that enables businesses to use “[a]ny other practical and
reasonably reliable method of calculation used in good-faith” 139 —
exacerbated the uncertainty in calculating the value of consumer data,
yielded a non-uniform methodology for computation, and created a
blueprint that is likely to produce inconsistent appraisals. Further, these
methods would help businesses to justify different cost and services
structures for consumers who elect to opt-out of sale.

131. See Duffy, supra note 129.
132. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.155(b) (2018) (“Any business, service provider, or other
person that violates this title shall be subject to an injunction and liable for a civil penalty of not
more than two thousand five hundred dollars … for each violation or seven thousand five hundred
dollars … for each intentional violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action
brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General.”).
133. See Duffy, supra note 129.
134. See Timothy Tobin, James Denvil, Laurie Lai, Aaron Lariviere & Filipo Raso, California
Consumer Privacy Act: The Challenge Ahead – The Impact of the CCPA on Data Driven
Marketing and Business Models, HOGAN LOVELLS (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.hldataprotection
.com/2018/11/articles/consumer-privacy/california-consumer-privacy-act-the-challenge-aheadthe-impact-of-the-ccpa-on-data-driven-marketing-and-business-models/.
135. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section I, at 1, https://oag.ca.gov
/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
136. Press Release, Attorney General Becerra Publicly Releases Proposed Regulations under the California
Consumer Privacy Act (Oct. 10, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerrapublicly-releases-proposed-regulations-under-california. The entire text of the draft regulations is available
at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-proposed-regs.pdf.
137. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.337(a).
138. See id. § 999.337(a)(1)–(8).
139. See id. § 999.337(a)(8).
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In his “initial statement of reasons”140 for the proposed regulations, the
California Attorney General recognized the multiplicity of valuation
formulas available to businesses and acknowledged that the value of data
fluctuates since the aggregate of businesses that collect data significantly
impacts the value of consumers’ data.141 Nonetheless, the Attorney General
presumed that the provisional list, which stipulates modes for calculating
the value of a consumer’s data,142 is a suitable resolution to the abstruse
nature of consumer data and sufficient to assist businesses in quantifying
that value. This presumption is sadly misguided as its “modeling may be
more complicated than it first appears, and difficult to defend if
challenged.” 143 Even if businesses understood and could utilize the first
seven methods enumerated in section 999.337(a),144 the blanket safeguard
that allows businesses to depart “from the methods listed in the subdivision
so long as the calculation method”145 is “practical . . . reliable . . . [and] used
in good faith,” 146 will likely open the floodgates to a host of arbitrary
methodologies that directly affect the incentives offered to consumers.
Moreover, the regulations provide no delineation of what “practical” or
“reliable” implicates and therefore, yet again, businesses are empowered to
decipher the language on their own.147
Section 999.337148 of the regulations is also completely deficient of any
language demarcating the latitude of businesses in vacillating between
permissible methods when quantifying data of individual consumers.149 The
omission is likely due to an assumption that all of the listed methods would
produce the same valuation irrespective of who supplies the data or when
the computation is made. Without evidentiary certainty, this presumption
140. See generally CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED
ADOPTION OF CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/
files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
141. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section IV, at 38, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/
all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
142. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.337(a)(1)–(8).
143. See Alston & Bird, The Draft CCPA Regulations: 21 Potentially Significant Business
Impacts, JD SUPRA (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-draft-ccparegulations-21-54730/.
144. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.337(a).
145. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section IV, at 39, https://oag.ca.gov/sites
/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
146. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.337(a)(8).
147. See Luke Sosnicki & James Shreve, What businesses need to know about the Attorney
General’s proposed CCPA regulations, THOMPSON COBURN LLP (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.
thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/cybersecurity-bits-and-bytes/post/2019-10-14/whatbusinesses-need-to-know-about-the-attorney-general-s-proposed-ccpa-regulations.
148. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.337.
149. See id. § 999.337(a) (“A business offering a financial incentive or price or service
difference subject to Civil Code section 1798.125 shall use and document a reasonable and good
faith method for calculating the value of the consumer’s data.”).
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may lead to internal inconsistency in calculating specific data valuations
and exasperate the overall uncertainty of how much a consumer’s personal
data is really worth. Furthermore, the Attorney General’s disclosure that the
legislature provided businesses with considerable discretion in finding a
valuation approach so that it could learn through their trials which method
was actually best150 exposes this solution’s shortcomings. This explanation
disguises section 999.337151 as a panacea that allows businesses to choose
from the buffet of methods for consumer data appraisal. In reality, it reveals
how businesses have carte blanche to select any valuation methodology that
generates the greatest return after swindling consumers into relinquishing
their data.
B. APPROXIMATING REASONABLENESS IN DATA
TRANSACTIONS
Assuming that we can calculate the value of a consumer’s data, sections
1798.125(a)(2) and (b)(1) mandate that the price or quality differential152
offered to consumers who provide their data must be “reasonably related to
the value provided to the business by the consumer’s data.”153 Again, this
“reasonably related” constraint 154 is asserted with no particularity or
guidance for interpretation. The regulations attempt to expound this unclear
language by providing impotent illustrative examples155 depicting a “price
or service difference” 156 that is “reasonably related.” 157 However, the
periphrastic nature of the examples and the oversimplification of the
underlying process that furnishes these models constrict the regulation’s
usefulness.
Once a business determines what it believes to be an accurate appraisal
of a consumer’s personal information, it must then construct a “reasonably

150. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section IV, at 38, https://oag.ca.gov/
sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
151. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.337.
152. See id. § 999.301(o) (“‘Price or service difference’ means (1) any difference in the price or
rate charged for any goods or services to any consumer . . . including through the use of discounts,
financial payments, or other benefits or penalties; or (2) any difference in the level or quality of
any goods or services offered to any consumer . . . including the denial of goods or services to the
consumer.”).
153. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018); see also CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL
STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT
REGULATIONS, Section IV, at 37, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isorappendices.pdf (noting that the “directly related” language used in § 1798.125(b)(1) should be
interpreted as “reasonably related” since this is more aligned with the intent of the CCPA to match
the difference to the value of the data).
154. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
155. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.336(d).
156. See id. § 999.301(o).
157. See id. § 999.336(b).
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related”158 offer that provides a different price or quality of service to the
consumer based on that initial valuation. 159 The difficulty in devising a
“reasonable” offer to exchange for personal information is concealed by an
assumption that overlooks the subjectivity involved in defining
“reasonable” within the data privacy context. Specifically, businesses
would need to transmute the monetary value that represents the data’s worth
into an incremental measurement of quality that can be reasonably
manipulated depending on whether the consumer retains or relinquishes
their information. Considering businesses’ profit-seeking motives, coupled
with the mandate that the offer must be “reasonably related”160 to the data’s
value, it quickly becomes apparent that determining reasonableness in the
context of data transactions will be difficult.
C. INCENTIVES WITH NO BOUNDS
Similarly, the financial incentives exception, which is described in
section 1798.125(b)(1),161 also demands further clarification because of its
poor drafting and unclear parameters.162 The financial incentives exception
reads, in part “[a] business may offer financial incentives, 163 including
payments to consumers as compensation, for the collection of personal
information, [or] the sale or sharing of personal information,”164 so long as
such “financial incentive practices” 165 are not “unjust, unreasonable,
coercive, or usurious in nature.” 166 As drafted, the financial incentives
exception is written in section 1798.125(b)167 which “is a separate clause
that is not part of the anti-discrimination clause, and therefore not tied to a
consumer’s exercise of rights.”168 Moreover, this exception is not explicitly
curtailed by the “reasonably related to” 169 mandate that applies to
businesses that offer enticing prices or qualitatively different services to
consumers.
Nevertheless, this exception has some qualifiers 170 that require
businesses that offer financial incentives to notify consumers of the

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
See id.
Id.
CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b).
See Tobin et al., supra note 134.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.301(j) (“‘Financial incentive’ means a program,
benefit, or other offering, including payments to consumers, related to the collection, deletion, or
sale of personal information.”).
164. CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b)(1) (2018).
165. Id. § 1798.125(b)(4).
166. Id.
167. See id. § 1798.125(b).
168. See Tobin et al., supra note 134.
169. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
170. See id. § 1798.125(b)(2)–(4).
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incentives pursuant to section 1798.130 171 and obtain prior opt-in
consent.172 Yet, section 1798.125(b) is relatively boundless with regard to
compensation payments made to consumers for the collection, sale, or
deletion of personal information. 173 Consequently, the qualifying
characteristics 174 provide the sole backstop for preventing discriminatory
incentives and businesses are left with “more questions than answers”175
about “how to structure their financial incentives.” 176 Although the
regulations require businesses to notify consumers of the “good-faith
estimate of the value of the consumer’s data that forms the basis for
offering the financial incentive,”177 and to provide “[a] description of the
method the business used to calculate the value of the consumer’s data,”178
the Act provides no method by which the compensation payment must be
computed. Additionally, since this exception is not governed by the
“reasonably related to” 179 constriction, businesses have wide latitude in
devising financial incentive payments. Finally, the Act’s failure to define
the scope of “unjust, unreasonable, coercive, or usurious”180 invites further
controversies as to the breadth of this exception.
Leaving businesses to decide the value of a consumer’s data and
thereafter fabricating a non-exhaustive list of methodologies 181 that
businesses may employ to compute this appraisal is dangerously imprudent.
Moreover, a business that offers financial incentives that it believes are
allowable and in harmony with the Act’s requirements may unknowingly
beget financial ramifications resulting from liability for noncompliance
since the Act offers no guidance for defining “unjust, unreasonable,
coercive, or usurious in nature”182 in the context of permissible financial
incentives. At the same time, consumers are in no position to appreciate
whether they are making a “good deal.” As it stands now, because of its
ambiguous language and boundless exceptions, the danger of this

171. See id. § 1798.125(b)(2).
172. This “opt-in” consent clause requires explanation of material terms of the incentive
program and must allow consumers the right to revoke their consent at any time. Id. §
1798.125(b)(3).
173. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b)(1) (“A business may offer financial incentives,
including payments to consumers as compensation, for the collection of personal information, the
sale of personal information, or the deletion of personal information.”).
174. See id. § 1798.125(b)(4).
175. See Jessica B. Lee, A Little Clarity, A Lot of Questions: An Analysis of the California AG’s
Proposed CCPA Regulations, LOEB & LOEB. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.loeb.com/en/insights
/publications/2019/10/an-analysis-of-the-california-ags-proposed-ccpa-regulations.
176. See id.
177. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.307(b)(5)(a).
178. See id. § 999.307(b)(5)(b).
179. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
180. See id. § 1798.125(b)(4).
181. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.337(a).
182. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b)(1) (2018).
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provision 183 poses a serious risk to businesses because of the financial
liability 184 imposed on businesses that violate the Act. Additionally,
consumers “still don’t know all the ways their information is being sold,
traded, and shared,” 185 and therefore cannot know whether an offer is
“unjust” or “coercive.”186 Thus, even if a business obtains consent before it
enters a consumer into a financial incentive program, “[u]ntil consumers
actually understand the ecosystem they’ve unwittingly become a part of,
[they] won’t be able to grapple with it in the first place.”187
IV. SOLUTION
“A valid consent presupposes that a data subject has fully understood
the consequences of his or her approval.”188
A. VOID THE REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
The California legislature must void the reasonable-relationship
exception detailed in section 1798.125(a)(2).189 The variability in data value
across different industries is too erratic and therefore, businesses that offer
consumers a different price or provide an altered quality of service will be
unable to formulate an alternative that would contemplate the inconsistent
valuations ascribed to specific data and pass muster under the Act. For
example, as noted by the California legislature, one factor that transforms
the value provided by a consumer’s data to the business is the “number of
businesses in the market for data.”190 Additionally, the value assigned to the
kind of information obtained is also highly subjective and often varies as
“data brokers and data exchange centers are multiplying”191 and thus, the
number of professionals collecting and selling personal data continues to
increase. For instance, general information about an individual, such as
“age, sex, [or] locality” is typically worth less than personal data on a
183. See generally id. § 1798.125.
184. See id. § 1798.155(b) (“Any business, service provider, or other person that violates this
title shall be subject to an injunction and liable for a civil penalty of not more than two thousand
five hundred dollars for each violation or seven thousand five hundred dollars for each intentional
violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the
people of the State of California by the Attorney General.”).
185. Louise Matsakis, The WIRED Guide to Your Personal Data (and Who Is Using It), WIRED
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-data-collection/.
186. See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b)(4) (2018).
187. Id.
188. I. van Ooijen & Helena U. Vrabec, Does the GDPR Enhance Consumers’ Control over
Personal Data? An Analysis from a Behavioural Perspective, J. CONSUM. POL. 42: 91–107, at 100
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-018-9399-7.
189. CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(a)(2) (2018).
190. See CA. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: PROPOSED ADOPTION OF
CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS, Section IV, at 38, https://oag.ca.gov/
sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/ccpa-isor-appendices.pdf.
191. See Pauline Glikman & Nicolas Glady, What’s The Value Of Your Data?, TECHCRUNCH
(Oct. 13, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/13/whats-the-value-of-your-data/.
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consumer such as their interests in a specific service or product. 192 The
capriciousness of appraising data and the co-dependency of its valuation on
various factors like “who uses it, how it is being used, and in what
context,”193 renders compliance with this provision unattainable. Therefore,
the exception must be voided as it is completely futile.
B. SUPPLEMENT THE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
EXCEPTION WITH MANDATED DISCLOSURES
With regard to the financial incentives exception described in section
1798.125(b)(1), 194 the California Attorney General must curtail the
indeterminable and unbridled exception that allows businesses to offer
compensatory payments to consumers. The restraints on businesses that
decide to offer financial incentives to consumers in exchange for their data
are insufficient since the Act provides no guidance on how to construe its
limitations. Although section 1798.125(b)(4) attempts to delineate
impermissible incentives by proscribing “financial incentive practices” that
are “unjust, unreasonable, coercive, or usurious in nature,”195 the California
Attorney General must include additional requirements that enhance
transparency from businesses to satisfactorily protect consumers from any
potentially discriminatory practices.
While much of the opposition surrounding the financial incentives
exception196 stems from the impracticability of quantifying consumer data,
further consideration is due concerning the tension between data privacy as
right and data privacy as a commodity. Generally, consumers do not
consciously register how retailers will subsequently profit from an email
address or other personal information that individuals often share when
signing up for loyalty programs or the like. 197 Nor do they immediately
contemplate the “the possible security ramifications if the email address is
obtained by a third party through a data breach.”198 In contrast to businesses
collecting this data, consumers attribute value to their data by the sensitivity
and breadth of the information being shared, and “expect more value in
return for data used to target marketing, and the most value for data that
will be sold to third parties.”199 Ultimately, consumers’ willingness to give
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See id.
See id.
CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b) (2018).
Id. § 1798.125(b)(4).
See generally CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b) (2018).
See Sam Sabin, In Data-Driven World, Consumers Likely to Overestimate Their
Information’s Value, MORNING CONSULT (June 3, 2019), https://morningconsult.com/2019/06/03/
data-driven-world-consumers-likely-overestimate-their-informations-value/.
198. See id.
199. See Timothy Morey, Theodore Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data: Designing for
Transparency and Trust, HARVARD BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customerdata-designing-for-transparency-and-trust.
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up their data to businesses in exchange for some return value turns on trust
and transparency about use.200 Yet, instead of operating from the vantage
point of the consumer, the financial incentives exception provides a marketbased solution for quantifying a monetary value for consumer data, and
fails to provide transparency to consumers who lack the competency needed
in order to transact in the data marketplace. While any financial incentive
should be directly related to the value provided by the consumer’s data,201
businesses must also provide value in the form envisaged by consumers.
This means increased disclosure and information that specifies exactly what
will happen with their data when they hit, “I agree,” in terms
comprehensible to the average consumer. Even if businesses must now state
how much your information is worth to them, without stricter requirements
surrounding disclosure, consumers will not feel in control over their data
and cannot provide knowing consent.
The legislative intent behind the CCPA was to enhance “Californians’
right to privacy by giving consumers an effective way to control their
personal information.”202 Accordingly, the regulations needed to clarify this
provision should construe its terms in harmony with that intent. The
exception must provide consumers greater control over their data and
mandate that businesses articulate uniform practices to formulate these
incentives which are clearly outlined from the start. If consumers
comprehend how their data is used and what they earn in exchange for such
use, they may be more willing to relinquish their information. 203 Hence,
businesses fare better “if they offer consumers safety, security, and trust,”204
while consumers get digestible answers concerning their information. By
adding these requirements, the legislative intent of providing “California
residents with greater transparency and control over how businesses collect
and use their personal information,”205 would also be promoted.
The CCPA has the potential to substantially alter the data marketplace.
Therefore, California must be judicious in implementing any exceptions to
these fundamental restrictions now imposed on businesses. Accordingly, to
advance the intent behind the Act generally, the financial incentives
exception 206 should survive since it attempts to transfer control over
personal data back to its rightful owner—the consumer. Autonomy includes
“the right to make decisions about oneself and one’s life trajectories, which

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
See CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b)(1) (2018).
Assemb. Bill 375, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 55, Sec. 2(g) (Cal. 2018).
Jessica B. Lee, The Value of Talking About the Value of Consumer Data, ADMONSTERS
(Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.admonsters.com/value-consumer-data/.
204. See id.
205. See Newman, supra note 114.
206. See generally CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.125(b) (2018).
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we call ‘decisional privacy.’” 207 To promote consumer autonomy, the
California Attorney General must produce additional regulations to the
financial incentives exception 208 that limit the latitude afforded to
businesses in constructing these incentive practices so as to clearly draw a
“line separating persuasion from coercion”209 in the context of permissible
incentives.
CONCLUSION
To achieve architectural perfection in data privacy legislation, one must
consider and untangle the surfeit of moving parts that go into building such
laws. To promulgate effective data privacy legislation in the 21st century
requires one to contemplate the benefits of “the proliferation of internet
technology,” 210 which has provided incomparable conveniences to
consumers, as well as the concomitant privacy invasion that is achieved
through the “tracking, storing, and sharing of what some consumers view as
their private information.” 211 In order to advance the legislative intent
behind the CCPA and give consumers autonomy over their personal data,
the California Attorney General should void the reasonable-relationship
exception 212 since it fails to provide meaningful protection to consumers
and offers a safe harbor for businesses exploiting their data. Additionally,
the legislature must implement further restrictions that reframe the financial
incentives exception to operate through the lens of a consumer, so that
businesses are forced to provide comprehensible disclosures regarding their
use of our data, rather than proffer arbitrary dollar amounts to justify its
collection. This is needed not only to maintain the integrity of the Act, but
also to promote genuine consumer autonomy over personal data.
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